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ABSTRACT
E STIM ATIO N  OF T R A D E  CREATING AN D  D IVER TIN G  
EFFECTS OF T U R K E Y -E C  CUSTOM S UNION ON  
TURKISH A U T O M O T IV E  INDUSTRY
Metin Çelebi 
Master of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Fatma Taşkın 
July, 1995
This study estiiTUites trade creation and diversion effects of the forthcoming 
Turkey-EC customs union on Turkish Automotive Industry. The study em­
ploys a rnicroeconornic-theory-based partial equilibrium cipproach. The prod­
uct group included in the analysis is the automobiles with three differentiated 
goods: domestically produced, imported from member countries and imported 
from non-member countries. Estimation of demand elasticities to be used in 
the estimation of trade creation and diversion is performed by using the Asymp­
totically Full Information Maximitm Likelihood method. Then, trade creation 
and diversion effects are estimated for five scenarios about the entrance date to 
and conditions of joining the customs union. The study concludes that trade 
creation and diversion effects lead to welfare improvements for each scenario 
defined, and joining the customs union reduces the demand for domestically 
produced automobiles in almost each scenario.
Key words: Customs Union, Trade Creation, Trade Diversion, Turkish Au­
tomotive Industry, Elasticity Estimation
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ÖZET
T Ü R K İY E -A T  G Ü M R Ü K  BİRLİĞİNİN T Ü R K  O T O M O T İV  
SANAYİİ ÜZERİNDEKİ T İC A R E T  YA R A TIC I V E  
SAPTIRICI ETKİLERİNİN ÖLÇÜLM ESİ
Metin Çelebi
Ekonomi Bölümü Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Dr. Fatma Taşkın 
Ternmuiz,, 1995
Bu çalışma, gerçekleşecek bir Türkiye-Avrupa Topluluğu gümrük birliğinin 
Türk Otomotiv Saniiyii üzerindeki ticciret yaratıcı ve saptırıcı etkilerini ölçmeyi 
cunaçlar. Çalışmada mikroekonomik teori tabanlı bir kısmi denge aımlizi kul­
lanılmıştır. Aıicüize dahil edilen mallar otomobil mal grubu içinde tanımlanan 
üç farklı malı içerir. Bunlar, yerli üretim malı, üye ülkelerden yapılan ithal malı 
ve üye olmciyan ülkelerden yapılan ithal malıdır. Ticaret yaratıcı ve saptırıcı 
etkilerin ölçülmesinde kullanılan talep esneklikleri Asymptotically Full Informa­
tion Maximum Likelihood metoduyla tahmin edilmiştir. Bundcin sonra, ticaret 
yaratımı ve saptırımı, birliğe girişin tarihi ve şartlarına göre oluşturulmuş beş 
senaryo dahilinde ölçülmüştür. Çalışmanın sonuçları göstermiştir ki; gümrük 
birliğine girmek (otomobil malları çerçevesinde) Türkiye’nin relah düzeyini her 
senaryoda artırcicaktır ve yerli üretilmiş otomobillere olan talep, senaryoların 
çoğunda azalacaktır.
Anahtar kelimeler: Gümrük Birliği, Ticaret Yaratımı, Ticaret Saptırımı, 
Türk Otomotiv Sanayii, Esneklik Tahmini
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Introduction
The ob jective of this study is to estimate the static trade creation and diversion 
eil'ects of forthcoming customs union with the European Community on Turkish 
Automative Industry. Turkey will most probably join the customs union at 
the beginning of year 1996. For many yccirs, political and ideological aspects 
of joining the customs union and an EC membership have been discussed. 
Although there is less than six months to the starting chite for entering customs 
union, economical aspects of joining have not received the attention which it 
deserves.
This study employs a microeconomic theory based demand approach to 
estimate trade and welfare effects of customs union. The product group covered 
in this study is automobiles and it is assumed that this product group includes 
three diffei'entiated goods: domestically produced ones, imported ones from 
member countries and from non-member countries.
In Chcipter 2, the first section includes the explanation of Turkey-EC re­
lations with emphasis on customs union. Moreover, some possible scenarios 
for the entrance date to the union and lor the date of alignment of external 
tariff to common external tariff are presented. The second section gives a brief 
discussion of the Turkish Automative Industry.
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Chapter 3 covers the theory of customs union where trade creation and 
diversion effects are introduced using the partial equilibrium aiicdysis. The 
relation between trade creation, trade diversion and welfare is explained and 
some likely cases of welfare gain from customs union formation are explained.
In chapter 4, a brief literature survey on estimation of trade creation and 
diversion is carried out with emphasis on ex-ante studies. Then, the model 
employed to estimate trade creation and diversion is presented in the first 
section in chapter 5. The results of the empirical estimates of the elasticities 
and trade crecition and diversion are presented in other sections in chapter 5.
Chapter 2
Turkey-EC Relations and 
Turkish Automotive Industry
Under the globalisation atmosphere of the second half of twentieth century, 
many countries have formed different kinds of integration in order to gain ad- 
vantcvges of economical and ¡political partnerships. The Euroi^ean Community 
(EC) has evolved as a powerful economical and political block in this atmo­
sphere.
Turkey, about thirty years ago, chose to be involved in this European block 
and almost continuously tried to be admitted into it. Pbr many years, political 
aspects of joining EC were discussed, but economical effects and advantages 
have not been analyzed in detail. In this study, trade effects of a possible cus­
toms union with EC on Turkish Automotive Industry, TAI, will be examined.
This chapter includes introductory information on Turkey-EC relations and 
Turkish Automotive Industry.
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2.1 Turkey-EC Relations
EEC (European Economic community) was formed in 1957 by Roma Agree­
ment by six European countries: France, West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Nether­
lands and Luxembourg. With enlargements toward north Europe first, and 
south EuroiDe next, EEC became a twelve-member community in 1990. In 
1993, EEC and ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) has combined 
cind took the name, EC.
'I'lie main goals of EEC Wcis to improve the welfare of citizens of member 
countries, to remove barriers on trade, to establish fair competition and to re­
move regional economic imbalances (Bozkurt [8]). In addition to goals of EEC, 
EC was formed to accomplish also monetary and political union. As the first 
chciir of European Commission, W. Hallstein said, ’The mission of the commu­
nity is not only related to economic activity but also politics.’ (Holland [19]). 
Therefore, EC became a political and economic power which affects not only 
its members, but also outsiders. From the point of view of an outsider coun­
try, to take place in EC may create new opportunities for increasing growth 
rate, improving technology and for forming strong and profitable international 
relations with members.
Considering the economical advantages and as a result of the political aim 
to be in close relationship with western countries, Turkey has signed Ankara 
Agreement in 1964 with community to form a customs union mainly for indus­
trial goods, with some exceptions such as textile goods. In 1973, Additional 
Protocol has been signed to arrange rules of transition to the customs union. 
All barriers on trade were decided to be fully removed in 11 years for some 
goods and in 22 years for others. The automotive industry goods were in the 
22-year-list.
For the 22-year list, it can be said that Turkey has obeyed the conditions 
of agreement and reduced tariffs according to the planned schedule. Planned 
and actual percentage tariff removals for the 22-year list from 1988 up to now
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Member
Non-member 44.5
1994
36
01/01/1995 01/01/1996 01/01/2000
27.5
27.2
0
27.2
0
10
Table 2.2: Percentage tariff rates on automobiles
Therefore, to estimate trade ci'eation and diversion effects of customs union 
on Turkish Automotive Industry (particularly on automobiles), this study will 
cuialyiie five scenarios in order to cover possible entrance dates to customs 
union.In the first scenario, it is assumed that Turkey joins customs union in 
the beginning of 1995 ¿irid does not align tariffs on imported automobiles from 
non-member countries to GET. Indeed, the external tariff rate is taken as 
the one in table 2.2. In the second scenario, the entrance date is again the 
beginning of 1995, but external tariffs are aligned to GET. In the third and 
fourth sceimrios, the entrance date is assumed to be the beginning of 1996, 
but extcriicil tariffs are not aligned to GET cind remains constcint at its 1995 
value in the former and aligned to GET in the latter scenarios. In the fifth 
scenario,it is assumed that tariffs on member countries are removed at the 
beginning of 1996 and tariffs on non-member countries are aligned to GET 
at the beginning of 2000. Note that this scenario will most probably be the 
irnlemented one. These five scenarios will be used in section 5.5 in order to 
estimate trade creation and diversion effects for possible scenarios of entering 
customs union.
No doubt, entering such a big union will affect all industries in Turkey to 
varying degrees. Since the focus of the study is on autornative industry, first, 
the Turkish Automative Industry (TAI) is introduced in the following section, 
before examining the effects of customs union on it in later chapters.
2.2 Turkish Automative Industry
The history of Turkish economy does not extend too far. The first automobile 
plants were founded about 30 years ago (Tofas and Oyak in 1968). Although 
there were some pilot productions before this date, those were less than ten
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are given in table 2.1. ^
..-1988 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Planned 40 50 50 60 70 70 80 90 100
Actucil 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Table 2.1; Tariff removals for the 22-year list
In 1993, all barriers on trade imposed by Turkey have been reduced into 
tcU’iff cuid public housing fund figures in order to reduce other protectionist 
instruments into the controllable two bcirriers on trade.
For common external tariffs (GET), community gave Turkey the right to 
preserve pre-union rates up to year 2000. But then, these rates will be re­
duced for Turkish imports to the level (10% for automobiles) determined by 
the community. GET will be applied to all countries except sixteen EG mem­
bers: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.
According to the Additional Protocol signed in 1973, Turkey was supposed 
to join the customs union in the beginning of 1995. However, due to some 
political reasons which are out of the scope of this study, the entrance date has 
been postponed.
For the time being, the entrance date has not been exactly determined 
yet. Depending on the decision of EG, Turkey will most probably join the 
customs union at the beginning of 1996. However, alignment of tciriffs on 
imported automobiles from non-member countries to the GET have decided 
to be postponed to the beginning of 2000. This means that Turkey is free to 
apply any tariff rate on automobiles from non-member countries until 2000, 
but after this date the GET (10% for automobiles) will be applied. Actual and 
planned tariff rates (including all duties) between 1994 and 2000 to be applied 
on imported automobiles from member and non-member countries are in table 
2.2.2
hSee Tore [18] p .l3
-Obtained from Automotive Manufacturers Association (AM A) [2]
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Therefore, to estimate trade creation and diversion effects of customs union 
on Turkish Automotive Industry (particularly on automobiles), this study will 
analyze five scenarios in order to cover possible entrance dates to customs 
union.In the first scenario, it is assumed that Turkey joins customs union in 
the beginning of 1995 and does not align tariffs on imported automobiles from 
non-member countries to GET. Indeed, the external tariff rate is taken as 
the one in table 2.2. In the second scenario, the entrance date is again the 
beginning of 1995, but external tariffs ¿ire aligned to GET. In the third and 
fourth scenarios, the entrance date is assumed to be the beginning of 1996, 
but external tariffs are not aligned to GET and remains constant at its 1995 
value in the former and aligned to GET in the latter scenarios. In the fifth 
sceriario,it is assumed that tariffs on member countries are removed at the 
beginning of 1996 and tariffs on non-member countries are aligned to GET 
at the beginning of 2000. Note that this scenario will most probably be the 
imlemented one. These five scenarios will be used in section 5.5 in order to 
estimate trade creation and diversion effects for possible scenarios of entering 
customs union.
No doubt, entering such a big union will affect all industries in Turkey to 
varying degrees. Since the focus of the study is on autornative industry, first, 
the Turkish Automative Industry (TAI) is introduced in the following section, 
before examining the effects of customs union on it in later chapters.
2.2 Turkish Automative Industry
The history of Turkish economy does not extend too far. The first automobile 
plants were founded about 30 years ago (Tofas and Oyak in 1968). Although 
there were some pilot productions before this date, those were less than ten
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automobiles. But the industry grown very fast: average growth rate of pro­
duction between 1987-1992 was 12.5% (from production size of 174,893 in 1987 
to 344,482 in 1992) compared to 4.6% for the food industry cind 4% for textile 
industry (Tezer [29] p. 4).
Todciy, the TAI includes 18 firms, five of which produces automobiles. All of 
these automobile plants make production under the license of foreign producers: 
three of them with European, one of them with American and one of them with 
.Japanese license. Hence, TAI has a close relationship with foreign automative 
industry, although tehnology and models are relatively old compared to foreign 
ones.
The industry is very important for the Turkish economy. The direct and 
indirect employment in the sector was around 500,000 and production value 
was $ 4.6 billion in 1992 (3% of GNP). Like in other countries, the TAI gained 
importance by its final production, usage of diversified inputs, its natural im- 
portcince in highwciy transportcition, its usage of high technology and improved 
production methods (Aksoy [1] pg.20). It is widely named as the locomo­
tive sector of the economy since it works with many side industries, such as 
steel&iron, glass, motor industries, etc.
Mciin problems of the TAI, while entering to customs union, are worth 
mentioning in order to make a brief but complete introduction to the indus­
try. Insufficiency of demand is the greatest one. The income level of Turkish 
consumers are very much below (give GNP per capita figures if necessary) 
the European consumers. Moreover, taxes on automobiles imposed by Turkey 
are about 2.5 times greater than the ones in Europe (about 20% in Europe 
compared to 45-50% in Turkey). These two factors lower the demand for au­
tomobiles considerably.
Moreover, TAI has major supply side problems. First of all, financicd costs 
are high due to high interest rates. Furthermore, labor productivity is low 
relative to foreign labor. According to the McKinsey I’eport submitted only to 
the firms in industry, the productivity of TAI firms is 68% lower than that of 
FEAI (Far East Automative Industry). Moreover, cost disadvantage is about
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22% more than that of FEAI (Tezer [29] pg.lO). One may think that TAI has 
a comparative advantage due to lower real wages, but it is offset by much lower 
labor productivity.
Production is done below the capacity and much more under the optimal 
production size. The capacity utilization ratio for the whole motor vehicle 
industry was 77% in 1992 and production capacity of the largest Turkish au­
tomobile plant is 70% of and that of the side industry is about 40-50% of 
the optimal production size in Europe(Tore [18] pg.l5). This is mainly due 
to insufficient demand. Number of automobiles per thousand person is 40 in 
Turkey, compared to the world average of 86 (Tezer [29] pg.7).
All in all, it cannot be argued that TAI is completely ready to and hcis an 
cidvcuitage in joining customs union with EC members. Hence, the probable 
effects of customs union on TAI should be estimated carefully to make rational 
subsidy programs for the sector.
Chapter 3
Customs Union Theory
The concept of economic integration is used to denote the combination of 
separate economies into larger groupings. The degree of combination leads to 
different types of integration schemes: preferential tariff cuts, free trade ¿irea, 
customs union, common market and economic union.
The weakest type of integration is the use oi preferential tariffs. A pertinent 
concept here is that of the Most Favored Nation (MFN). A MFN clause in 
a treaty specifies that any tariff reduction on the goods concerned that is 
subsequently given to other nations will cilso be applied to the first nation.
The next step in economic integration is the free trade area. A free trade 
cirea reduces tariffs to zero between members within the area, with each country 
api^lying its own tariffs to external imports.
The next degree of integration is the customs union., that we are analyzing 
in this study. A customs union also has zero internal tariff, but agrees to apply 
a Common External Tariff (GET) to the outside world.
A further step toward integration is to include factor integration. A com­
mon market, in addition to being a customs union, also allows for the free flow 
of factors of production between countries.
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The last step in economic integration is the economic union, in which policy 
integration is added in addition to common market.
Since this study analyzes the effects of joining customs union on Turkish 
Automotive Industry, we will focus on this type of integration. In the first sec­
tion, gciins from the free trade will be examined with emphasis on specialization 
of production. In the second section, effects of customs union is analyzed using 
concepts of trade creation and diversion, and in the last section, likely cases of 
gain from union formation and theory of second best is discussed.
3.1 Gains Prom P^ee Trade
Most of the theoretical effort has been put into attempting to demonstrate that 
the establishment of a customs union leads necessarily to an improvement in 
welhire, along the lines of the gains associated with moving from a state of no 
trade to free international trade. This may be called as the optimistic view 
on the effects of customs union. A major argument by Bhagwati [6], which 
supports the optimistic view about the effects of customs union, states that 
there exists a trade vector and lump-sum compensatory payments such that 
all countries will not be worse-off after the union. Although this proposition 
does not say anything on welfare of individual countries in the absence of 
compensation, it asserts that world welfare improves (or remains constant) for 
some trade vector and compensatory payments after the formation of union. 
The direct application of the traditional theory regarding the gains from trade 
would appear to be clear-cut, but it turns out that such a gain cannot be 
presumed a priori for the establishment of a customs union.
In order to demonstrate this notion, it is important to review the traditional 
theory as it applies to the gains involved with removing tariff on a good on 
which tariff was applied previously. The partial equilibrium analysis for such 
a situation is presented in figure 3.1, where D and S are the domestic demand 
and supply curves, respectively for the good.
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Figure 3.1: Tariff removal
The autarky (no triide) price for this good (P^) is relatively high compared 
to the world price (Pw), thus demonstrating that the country does not have a 
compcirative advantage in the production of the good. Once again ciccording 
to standard international trade theory, this is probably due to the fact that the 
country is relatively insufficiently endowed with the factors of production that 
are used relatively intensively in the production of the good. Allowance of free 
trade would, by competition, make P^ the domestic as well as the world price 
(of course by assuming that the good in question is perfectly homogeneous), 
generating total quantity demanded {OB),  domestic production (OA),  cuid 
imports (AB).  The establishment of the world as the domestic price in this 
case allows for greater welfare through increased consumption and a shifting of 
resources to some other, presumably more efficient use, thus taking advantage 
of specialization.
These gains from trade will be reduced if an import tax was imposed on the 
good in question before the implementation of free trade. Say that a specific 
tciriff equal to the distance between Pw ¿wid Pr was imposed by the importing 
country, and that this country’s imports are small compared to world trade in
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this commodity. In this case the country faces a perfectly elastic (flat) supply 
schedule for the good, and the domestic price of the good decreases by the full 
cimount of the tariff to Pw.  Consumption rises to OB,  domestic production 
decreases to OA,  and imports rise to AB.
In this situation the country experiences a net gain in welfare. There is a 
gain in consumer welfare since consumers will pay a lower jürice for the good 
and will, therefore increase their quantity demanded (by DB).  In figure 3.1, 
there is thus a gain in consumer welfare of the area Pw PtEJ,  since the price 
has dropped to Pw- However, removing tariffs will lead to a loss in producer 
surplus by the area Pw PtEH  since at world prices, profits of domestic firms 
will shrink. Moreover, there is the loss of tciriff revenue which was collected on 
CD  portion of imported goods before the abolishment of tariff rates. The loss 
in tariff revenue is the area GFEI.  The net welfare change is the sum of these 
three effects. Hence, triangles H FG  and l E J  in figure 3.1 represents the net 
gain from free trade.
With this type of analysis it would appear to be a simple extension to 
conclude that formation of a customs union, as long as the average tariff wall 
to the outside world was not increased upon formation of the union, would 
be an unambiguous gain to the members and world welfare. In fact, this 
was the presumption when the notion of a postwar European union was being 
intended. However, such an optimistic view is not necessarily warranted due 
to trade creating and trade diverting effects of customs unions.
3.2 Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
Before 1950’s, it was generally believed that the formation of the customs union 
was a step toward free trade and therefore it tended to increase welhxre. But 
in 1950, Viner [30] showed that this is not necessarily correct. In particular, he 
showed that the formation of customs union combines elements of freer trade 
with elements of greater protection and may either improve or worsen resource
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allocation and welfare.
Trade creation is defined as the increiise in imports of a tariff reducing coun­
try (due to switching from high-cost domestic products to low-cost imports) 
from partners. Trade diversion is the increase in imports of a tariff reducing 
country (due to switching from low-cost non-member products to high-cost 
member products) from member countries [25, 26].
These definitions are quite general cuid hence different interpretations has 
been made in the literature. The interpretation by Meade [23] is the most 
widely used one. He perceived trade creation to be resulted from the creation 
of trade that was not existed before the formation of customs union. This 
definition includes the increase in imports from member countries both due to 
replacement of domestically produced goods and due to expansion of imports 
resulting from the fall in price. The second part, expansion of trade because 
price fall, was not accounted for by Viner [30], who put forwcird the distinction 
between trade creation and diversion first in the literature. He thought that 
trade creation is only due to replacement of domestically produced goods by 
imports from member countries since he has implicitly assumed thcit demand 
function is inelastic.^
The trade diversion, in Meade’s terms, can be defined as the result of switch­
ing from lower cost imports from non-member countries to higher cost imports 
from member countries. Viner has the same definition for it, but the amount 
of diversion is smaller in Viner’s terms due to implicit assumption of inehistic 
demand curve.
The two approaches can be illustrated by an example in figure 3.2. Sup­
pose there are three countries: the non-member country, Z, is the lowest cost 
producer; the member country, V, is a higher-cost producer; and the home 
country, X , is the highest-cost producer of a commodity, i.e.
< Pk < Px
^See details in [12]
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where P,· represents the cost of producing that good in country i, {i =  
X, Y, Z) and suppose tariff inclusive prices are such that Pzt (for non-member 
country) is lower than Pyx (for member countries), i.e.
P^T < P rr < Px
Hence, for a homogeneous good, home country makes all of its imports from 
the non-member country, Z, before the formation of customs union.
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Meade’s and Viner’s Trade Creation-Trade Diver­
sion concepts
Then, removing tariffs on member country, F, will divert trade from low 
cost non-member, Z, products to high cost Y. Viner defined this case as trade 
diversion and it is the rectangle E F GD  which represents the net loss from 
diverting the initial amount of imports from lower-cost source (country Z) to 
higher-cost source (country Y), in figure 3.2. But Meade argued that this 
would be the complete definition of trade diversion if the price elasticity of 
demand were zero (represented by the demand curve D). Hence, according to 
Meci.de, as seen in figure 3.2 , there is also a trade expansion, the line segment 
JK,  due to non-zero demand elasticity (represented by the demcind curve D').
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Hence, trade diversion in Meade’s terms becomes the rectangle D E L M  which 
is greater than Viner’s trade diversion by the rectangle FGLM.
Removing tariffs will lead to trade creation in both Viner and Meade, but 
with different amounts. Trade creation of Viner is the triangle on the left, HID,  
which results from the replacement of high-cost domestic products. However, 
trade creation is the tricingle H I D  plus the right triangle M N O  in Meade’s 
terms, the difference comes from the non-zero demand elasticity and hence due 
to trade expansion, JK.
Note that trade creation is a welfare improving effect as seen in figure 
2. The two triangles representing the trade creation are parts of net welfare 
increcise coming from consumer and producer sui’i l^us. However, trade diversion 
represented by the rectangle E DML  is the part of welfare worsening tariff 
revenue loss.
From now on, further analysis will use trade creation and diversion concej^ts 
of Meade, which is widely used and more realistic than those of Viner.
In figure 3.2, both trade creation and diversion were observed due to the 
particular setup of prices. With a different combination of prices, as in figure 
3.3, trade diversion will be zero and one can observe the jiure trade creation.
Again assume that the good in consideration is a homogeneous one. Ini­
tially, the domestic price of the good is Pkt, which is country V ’s export price 
(Pv) plus the specific tariff. Country Z does not enter into trade since its (in­
clusive of tariff) price, P^r, lies above Pyr (PzT ¿ Pf t )· If, then, the union is 
established, the price in X  drops to Py, consumption expands to OD,  domestic 
production drops to OC,  and imports expand to CD.  The shaded triangles 
represent the exact obverse of the losses incurred through tariff imposition; this 
is a pure case of what is termed trade creation, and there is an absolute gain 
in welfare. In fact, the gain might have been even more obvious and dramatic 
held the pre-union tariff been high enough to place both Py and Py above the 
autarky price P^. Then no trade would have taken place prior to the union, 
and trade would have been literally created as opposed to merely increased.
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F'igure 3.3: Pure Trade Creation
An example applied to an extreme case may be used to demonstrate the 
nature of trade diversion. Figure 3.4 shows a case similar to that in figure 2, 
in Meade’s terms, except that there are perfectly inelastic supply and demand 
curves over the relevant range in country X  for the commodity (thus yielding 
neither quantity changes nor trade creation upon tariff reduction). Such a case 
should be called one of pure trade diversion.
Say that the product is coming in at a price of 10 $ per unit from country 
Z, a 4 $ tariff is being imposed (which results in a pre-union price of 14 $), 
and that 1,000 units are being imported. The tariff revenues (4,000 $) cire 
then refunded to consumers in lower income and/or commodity taxes. The net 
cost to the society is 10,000 $, and the tariff only changes relative prices, with 
(in this case) neither reallocation nor consumption effects. If, then, a customs 
union is formed with Y, the tariff is dropped (on Y) and goods come in at 12 
$, for a total country cost of 12,000 $. The difference (2,000 $) is the rectangle 
shown in figure 3.4, and is, again, a pure loss to the country for forming a 
union.
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F’igure 3.4: Pure Trade Diversion
Looking at the less extreme case, then, whether or not a union will be 
l)erieficial depends on the balance between the two effects -trade creation and 
trade diversion. It is, therefore, at least theoretically possible that freer trade 
may not be optimal in the sense of increasing either the country’s welfare or 
the overall productive efficiency of the world.
In this analysis of trade creation and diversion, it is implicitly assumed that 
the tariff rate imposed after the formation of customs union on non-mernber 
country Z is at the same level that that the customs union agreement requires 
for GET (Common External Tariff rate). If the home country has a different 
pre-union tariff rate for country Z, then there are two cases: either the GET 
included price of imports from country Z, Pzc, is lower than Py or higher than 
Py. In the latter case, there is no change in results (even in amounts) for a 
homogeneous good, since Py will still be the lowest price.
However, in the former case in which GET included price of imports from 
country Z is lower than Py, trade creation increases (See figure 3.5).
In this case, domestic production drops from OC (which results from a 
customs union without ciligning GET) to OC' and imports from country Z
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Figure 3.5: Trade Creation with Common External Tariff
increases from CD to C D '. Hence, trade creation increases from sum of the 
areas of triangles E FG  and H U  to K F L  and MI N.  There is no switching 
in source of imports, and hence there will be no trade diversion. Empirically, 
however, this is not a usual situation since CET is determined not to improve 
the world welfare but to improve welfare of member countries.
For non-homogeneous goods, in the latter case, results depend on ehisticities 
of substitution between differentiated goods. In the former case, there will be 
no trade diversion, but the result for trade creation is ambiguous and depends 
on elasticities of substitution again.
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3.3 Likely Cases of Gain From Union Forma­
tion
As mentioned above, there is no certainty on gains from joining a customs 
union. This does not mean, however, that no guidance can be given as to the 
type of situations that are likely to involve a net gain irom union formation, 
and various assertions have been made in this regard.
Unfortunately the customs union literature has used rather vague concepts 
of competition and complementary commodities, and drawn conflicting, and 
often rather confusing conclusions about the likelihood for gain from union 
formation, depending on the nature of the commodities produced by potential 
members. The problem here is one of deilnition and specifying tariff levels 
upon fonricition. A similar, more useful, and certainly clear concept is one 
of relative efficiencies, as employed by Overturf [24], between potential union 
members. He suggests that the more dissimilar are the cost ratios between 
potential union members, the greater the potential gain from union formation.
This may be demonstrated in figure .3.6, which shows a high cost producer 
X  entering into a union with relatively low-cost producer Y, with resultant 
significant trade creation outweighing trade diversion. Of course, it is possible 
the Z may be so much more efficient than Y  that this result does not hold, but 
a significant divergence between P^ · and Py makes this less likely to occur.
The converse also appears to hold, as long as the union pcirtner in fact 
picks up the trade upon formation. Thcvt is, the more similar are the cost 
ratios between potential union members, and the more dissimilar these are 
with respect to the outside world, the greater the potential loss from the union 
formcition.
This is demonstrated in figure 3.7, which has high-cost producer X  import­
ing from low-cost Z before union, but similarly high-cost Y after union. Trade 
diversion in this case significantly outweighs trade creation.
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Given the above, it can be said, in addition, that the higher the original 
tariffs on potential partners, the greater the probability of significant gain upon 
the elimination of those duties. Of course, if a reduction of duties would involve 
net cost due to trade diversion, a large reduction in tariffs would simply entail 
large trade diversion.
The notion of trade creation and diversion, which was first developed in 
consideration of customs union formation, has far reaching implications for 
the science of economics. It suggests that, in general, any change seeming to 
move toward a global optimal situation may not, in fact, be an optimal move 
in a non-optirnal world. This, the Theory of Second Best, means that there is 
always a large degree of uncertainty about the positive results of any suggestion 
made regarding economic policy.'^Economists cannot, in other words, state with 
certainty that piecemeal movements toward greater competition, for example, 
are an absolute good.
^See Bhagwati [6] pg.284 and Overturf [24] pg. 27 for details.
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Figure 3.7: Similar cost ratios between members
Specifically with regard to customs unions, this meant that a categorical 
approval could no longer be given to their formation, since it had previously 
been assumed that, even though it might take a long time to reach cibsolute 
free trade, gradual expansion of customs union participation would always lead 
to improvement. Each case would have to be decided on its own merits, by 
balancing costs against benefits, both of which are, by their very nature, very 
difficult to measure.
Besides the static effects of trade creation and diversion, customs unions 
have some interesting dynamic effects, such as increased competition, stimulus 
to technical change, stiimUus to investment, and economies of scale. These 
so-called dynamic effects do not lend themselves easily to systematic analy­
sis and are out of the scope of this study. Hence, these effects will not be 
analyzedfurther in this study.^
Finally, two general conclusions follow from the Theory of Second Best.
^For more iiilorniation, see Ghacholiades [9] pp.270-1.
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These are that a union will be more likely to raise welfare (1) the greater 
the amount of total trade that takes place between potential members, and 
(2 ) the smaller trade is as a proportion of total expenditures in each potential 
member. The rationale behind both of these is that the smaller the distortion of 
relative prices caused by having tariff barriers to the outside world, the smaller 
the probability that these will significantly skew production and consumption 
decisions.
Chapter 4
A Brief Literature Survey on 
Estimation of Trade Creation 
and Trade Diversion
Models for estimating trade creation and diversion are mainly classified into 
two categories; ex-ante and ex-post models. The former ones make forecasting 
for trade flows before the establishment of customs union and then estimate 
trade creation and diversion using these forecasts, while the others have the 
realized trade flows on hand and just estimate trade creation and diversion. In 
the customs union literature, some of major contributions to the application 
of customs union theory which are related to the framework of this study can 
be clcissified as , Baldwin&Murray [5], Cline et al. [11], Ginman et al. [17] and 
Rahmcin [25] cimong ex-ante studies; and Balassa [4], EFTA Secretariat [27], 
Kreinin [20] and Dayal and Dayal [12] among ex-post studies. Studies in each 
category will be examined in the chronological order, beginning with ex-post 
studies.
23
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4.1 Ex-Post Studies
Balassa (1967), in his study analyzing the impact of EEC on trade creation 
and trade diversion, argued that assuming income elasticities of import demand 
remains unchanged in the absence of customs union, if income elasticity of de­
mand lor imports from all sources of supply increases, there is a trade creation. 
The logic of this approach is that when tariff is reduced for the partner country, 
there is a rise in demand due to income expansion.^ This is ciccompanied by 
an increase in the gross income elasticity.
Balassa cilso computed, instead of income elasticities, the growth rates of 
imports into the common rncirket in the pre-integration and post-integration 
periods separately, and then derived the two estimates of post-integration im­
ports by applying the two growth rates to the pre-integration imports. The 
difference between the two estimated imports was ascribed to integration.
EFTA Secretariat (1969) employed the share of imports in consumption 
to estimate trade creation. This ex-post study assumed that where there is 
a significant protective tariff on some commodity, this is because domestic 
production costs are higher than those of some potential foreign suppliers. 
Hence, trade creation takes place when share of imports in consumiDtion rises. 
On the other hand, when share of imports in consumption falls, there is trcide 
diversion.^
In both Balassa and EFTA Secretariat studies, some drawbacks are ob­
served. First of all, integration effects are assumed to be the difference between 
pre-union and post-union values. However, this is not the case in general. 
There may be other factors such as autonomous changes in prices, technolog­
ical changes and estimation errors in regressions. Moreover, it is assumed in 
both of the studies that the price of the imported product in the domestic mar­
ket of the importing country changes by the full amount of the tariff change. 
However, this is a process with two steps. Firstly, tariff changes effect prices
hSee [12, 28] for details.
^See [12] for details
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and price changes (if any) effect trade flows, ff foreign producers have some 
market power (monopolistic or oligoiDolistic markets), tariff removals may have 
no effect on prices of imported goods. Hence, in order tariff removals to affect 
prices fully, there must be either competitive foreign markets or production 
is below the optimal production size, by which economies of scale is obtained 
optimally, for foreign hrnis.
The second major drawback is that changes in total imports into a member 
country are treated as trade creation in both of the studies. Actually, these 
import changes represent a mixture of trade creation and diversion in the sense 
that some part of change in imports from member countries represents the 
switching from domestic goods and some part represents the switching from 
imports from non-member countries.
Another often-quoted ex-post study to estimate trade creation and diversion 
is the one by Kreinin (1969). He argued that the influence of customs union 
on trade flows are mixed up with those of other factors including changes in cif 
prices. In order to seggregate the effect of these factors, he used import demand 
functions for each member of EEC, separately for its total imports, imports 
from partner countries and those from third countries, by regressing the index 
of volume of imports on real GNP and the ratio of the import price index to 
the domestic wholesale price index for the pre-integration period. From these 
functions, he derived estimated imports for each of the post integration years. 
The difference between the actual and estimated total imports Wcis desigiicited 
as trade creation; and the difference between the actual and estimated imports 
from non-member countries was taken as trade diversion. The main assumption 
of this study is that tariff reduction is fully conveyed into the price, as done in 
Balassa [4] and EFTA Secretariat [27]. Another drawback is that since relative 
prices are taken as an explanatory variable of demand, change in import due 
to absolute price changes is not taken into account.
in Daycil and Dayal (1977) paper, it was argued that trade crecition and 
diversion concepts should lend themselves to proper econometric measurement. 
Hence, they made an anology with income effect and substitution effect to form
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concepts of trade creation and diversion. In particular, if the price of imports 
from a member country falls, consumers’ income seems to increase and demand 
from all sources increases. This is income effect and said to correspond to the 
trade creation. On the other hand, in that case, since relative i r^ice of imports 
from the member country decreases, demand from other sources decreases. 
This is the substitution effect and said to correspond to the trcide diversion. 
Hence, it is implied that if income effect is greater than substitution effect, 
there is a net trade creation which improves the welfare of the society.
4.2 Ex-Ante Studies
Ex-ante studies made by Baldwin and MuiTciy (1977), Ginman et al.(1980) and 
Cline et al.(1978) can be examined by using a common framework. The model 
appearing in all of these studies employs price elasticities of import demand 
to predict the trade creation effect of changes in the prices of imports relative 
to the prices of domestic products, and cross elasticities to predict the trade 
diversion effect of changes in relative prices among foreign suppliers of imported 
products. The main difference among these studies is the choice of values 
cissumed for the cross elasticities. The values are usually chosen arbitrarily 
for lack of good, prior empirical estimates, and consequently, cirguments over 
conflicting results generally boil down to questions about the reasonableness 
of the cross elasticities.
The partial equilibrium model of the import market employed in these stud­
ies assumes product diffei’entiation among suppliers, iso-elastic import demand 
functions, infinite supply elasticities, and no changes in income, exchange rates 
or cif prices. The import demand equation for a given product from one set of 
foreign suppliers (denoted by subscript 1 ) is usually rewritten as a differential 
exjDenditure function. The change in prices of this good I’elative to the prices of 
domestically produced substitues (later denoted by subscript 3) and relative to 
the prices of substitues from other foreign suppliers (later denoted by subscript
2 ) is T'l dtiU-ti following a preferential reduction in the ad-valorem tariff rate
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Hence, it is implicitly assumed that tariff rate reduction is fully conveyed 
into price reduction. This is a preferential tariff cut because it is applied only 
to imports of product (1 ) supplied by the beneficiaries of the ¡^reference, while 
product (2 ) produced by non-beneficiary foreign suppliers is subject to the 
same rate as belore, i.e. = t\. Although this is not conformed to an analysis 
of customs union where tariff rate on non-member products are changed so 
as to align with GET (Common External Tariff), such a framework can give 
reasonable estimation methods for trade creation and diversion.
The combined trade creation cuid diversion effects of this preferential tariff 
cut equal the following change in the tariff exclusive value of imports (M i) 
from benehciaries of the tariff preference:
dMi =  M\Ti{ni — ni2) (4.1)
whe:re
7ii : own price elasticity of import demand 
?ii2 : cross price elasticity of import demand.
In the case of a MEN (Most Eavoured Nation) tariff cut where Ti =  T2 , the 
relative jDi'ice change among suppliers is zero and the cross price elasticity drops 
from equation 4.1. The import expansion is due solely to to trade creation, 
which is written for product 1 as :
dMi =  Ml Tim
Now if we assume a well-behaved and separable utility function as done 
in Clague [1 0 ], we can obtain trade creation and diversion with a micro-based 
analysis. In this way, we Ccin define the degree of substitution among differenti­
ated products, the issue which is at the core of disagreements over appropriate 
values for cross elasticities.
Let us denote Mi {i =  l , . . . ,a ; )  as the expenditures of a country on any 
foreign or domestic product i. For simplification, aggregate (x — 3) products
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into a group denoted by the subscript (4), and focus on the remaining three 
products. Then, Clague’s demand equation for the beneficiary product (1 ) may 
be written in the following differential expenditure form:
ı^ ,τ _  nj rp —^h2S\2 — hsSis — hiLiSM — {h-i +  +  h3)hiSi
h, +  /г, +  hs------------------------- ] ^
where
hi : the share of product i in total exi^enditures (i =  1 ,.. .  ,4)
_  Mi
~  ( E L  w.)
Sij : the elasticity of substitution between good i and j
and Si4 =  a is a constant, indicating equal substitutability of 
products (1,2,3) for all other products (4), ( i ,j  =  1 ,.. .  ,4 ;f /  j )
Si : the income elasticity of derncind for product ( 1 ), assumed to be the 
same for products (1,2,3).
In the Ccise of an identical MFN tariff cut where 1\ =  7 2 and there is no 
change in relative price among foreign suppliers, the trade creation would be :
—/î3Si3 — {hi +  h2)h/iSi/i — [hi +  /12 +  hz){hi +  h2)si.
r C  =  dMi =  Mi7\[- h\ T I1 2  + -] 
(4.3)
The bracketed expressions in equation 4.2 and equation 4.3 define (ni — ??,i2) 
and '/¿1, respectively.
Then, cross price elasticity becomes,
_ /^ 2(^12—” 14 )
/ij4-/i2+/l3
where
ni4 =  LiSu +  (hi +  /i2 +
which is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand for the aggregate of 
products (1,2,3) since all ¿’¿4 are equal.
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Now, with this framework on hand, we can determine whether or not the 
prediction techniques of Baldwin and Murray [5], the UNCTAD Secreteriat gin- 
man and the Brookings study [1 1 ] were consistent with the assumptions un­
derlying their models.
Bcddwin cuid Murrciy (1977) adopted an ad-hoc method to estimate trade 
(fiversion in the absence of good estimates for cross price elaasticity, rii2 · They 
assume that substitutability between domestic and non-beneficiary product is 
sirnilcir to the substitutability between domestic and beneficiary product. Since 
the latter substitutability is the trade creation (TC), and can be rewritten as 
a share of domestic production, trade diversion (TD) becomes trade creation 
weighted by the ratio of imports from non-beneficiaries , M2 , to the domestic 
pi'oduction, M 3 . Hence,
TD= TC g
The standard formula tor trade diversion was
TD = MTl\nn
Hence, Baldwin and Murray has implicitly defined
Mo
«12  =
Here, the implicit assumption is zero elasticity of domestic demand for the 
aggregated product group. It can be seen by precisely putting S12 =  «13 and 
using Clague’s analysis that
„  _  -Il2(ni-nn) Mo I „  M-.
« ] 2  -  -  - « 175^ +  « 1 4 -Mz
If ni4 is different from zero, TD in Baldwin and Murray analysis will be 
underestimated.^
Brookings study performed by Cline et al.(1978) also uses n interchangeably 
for rii and « 2 , hence S13 -- ¿¡23· The cross elasticity, ni2 , is defined in terms of 
^See [17, 22] for details.
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the relationship between import shares and the elasticity of substitution. The 
change in imports, clMi, is now interpreted to mean only that change resulting 
from the reduction in beneficiary prices, holding total imports constant.'* The 
cross elasticity is estimated to be
«12 ¡'■2S12
Hut Cline et al. calculated it as
« 1 2  =_  h'2Sl2
although they did not mention of tin' fact that this implies the relative price 
change, 'Ti is zero.
Therefore, their study is consistent with Clague’s framework only if tar­
iff change is negligible, domestic demand elasticity is zero and domestic pro­
duction is zero. These cissumptions will yield an exaggerated cross elasticity 
estimate and underestimate the welfare improving effects of tariff reduction.
In UNCTAD analysis done by Ginrnan et al.(1980), the basic assumption 
is that non-beneficiary products will be displaced by beneficiary products on 
a one-for-one basis, i.e. ¿>13 =  2^3) iwid that n =  ni =  ri2 is an appropriate 
estimate of 1 1 1 2 . Then,
TD =  M2Tmi and
n\2 - — «1 M2Ml
Here, the implicit assumption is zero demand elasticity and market share 
equality for beneficiaries and domestic producers.
Rahman et al.(1981) made a study to estimate the static trade effects of 
a probable customs union in South Asia comprising Bengladesh, India, Nepal, 
Pcikistan and Sri Lanka. This study is important due to considering the effect 
of aligning the CET (Common External Tariff) -an important aspect which has 
been ignored in the empirical literature- in addition to normal tariff removals
’ See [22] for details.
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for partner countries. They have constructed the model based on Bhuyan [7] 
and Viner [30]. The model assumes that tariffs are the only barrier to trade; the 
price effects on trade have no lag; the production methods, factor supplies and 
tastes remain unaltered; other induced changes on imports are non-existent; 
and the export supply of the union is infinitely elastic.
The two basic equations representing the change in imports are
= Σ  + Σ  ei(=7 3 ^ A f.„)
¿=1  ^ i=l ^
ΔΜ.,. = Σ  -  g ’ - t m  -  <-ΓΤ7Γ » · Mi
(4.4)
(4.5)
where
Mi : volume of imports of the Tth commodity (f =  1 , . . . ,  m)
Mu,i : initial (pre-union) intra-regional import of the f ’th commodity 
My^ i : initial extra-regional import of the ¿’th commodity 
ti : initial tciriff rate on f ’th commodity
Ci : rates of common external tariff on Tth commodity
e; : price elasticity of import demand for ¿’th commodity of a member concerned.
r}i ; elasticity of substitution for ¿’th commodity.
J:i— refers to removal of tariffs for member countries and refers
to aligning tariffs to Ci for non-member countries and these two expressions are 
the percentage changes in tariff inclusive prices.
Equation 4.4 shows the direct price effects of a customs union on a mem­
ber’s total imports including trade creation and trade diversion. Equation 4.5 
represents the trade diversion if negative and trade expansion if positive. The 
first term in equation 4.4 is the trade creation since it indicates the chcinge in 
member’s imports from inside the union as a result of tariff elimination.
Therefore, we have summarized some important works on the estimation 
of trade creation and trade diversion. In the following chapter, the model 
used in this study will be built which will be based on microeconomic theory 
Ibundations.
Chapter 5
Estimation of Trade Creation 
and Trade Diversion for 
Turkish Automotive Industry
In the previous chapter, a background has been given for the Turkish Auto­
motive Industry (TAI)cUid for the theoretical cuid empirical aiuilysis of trade 
creation and diversion.
This cimpter will formulate the estimation procedure cind give empirical 
estimation results for triide creation and diversion, focusing on automobiles, 
one of the product groups in TAI products. The automobiles product group 
is chosen since it is the most important fined product of the industry with its 
80% share in total industry production (number of vehicles) in 1994.*
The model for estimation of trade creation and diversion is given in sec­
tion 1. Then, the model for estimating demand elasticities are given in sec­
tion 2. Section 3 contains information on data used for estimations cuid sec­
tion 4 contains regression results. Section 5 presents empirical estimation re­
sults of trade creedion and diversion for each scenario defined in section 2 .1 . 
The chapter ends with the concluding remarks.
^Obtained horn [3] pg-23
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5.1 The Model For Estimation of Trade 
Creation and Diversion
In this section, first the change in trade flows of automobiles resulting from the 
Turkey-EC customs union will be formulated by employing a demand based 
partial equilibrium approach. Then, ti'cide creation and trade diversion will be 
defined depending on change in trade flows.
The model assumes a country which will join a customs union, and is ini­
tially importing the differentiated good from two different sources: member 
and non-member countries. It is assumed that imports from preferred coun­
tries, non-preferred countries and domestic goods are differentiated goods of a 
general good (the general good in this study is automobile); and tariff reduc­
tions cvnd increases have no effect on exchange rates or money incomes. All 
changes in trade flows are assumed to be due to joining the customs union.
It is assumed that changes in tariff rates are fully reflected into prices. This 
assumption is justified by assuming competitive or non-cooperative oligopolis­
tic foreign markets. In case of a tariff reduction, if these markets were monop­
olistic or cooperative oligopolistic, foreign producers would find it profitable 
(cind possible) to increase the exports prices up to the point where the price 
of their products after tariff reduction is equal to the one before tariffs. But 
by assuming competitive or non-cooperative foreign markets, iDroducers cannot 
increase their export prices due to competition among them.
Moreover, sui^ply functions for imported goods are assumed as infinitely 
ehistic, since imports of the home country is small compared to the world 
trade on this commodity. The demand functions of all goods are cissumed to 
take the log-linear form.
It is also assumed that consumers carry out utility maximization with a two 
stage budgeting and a separable utility function, i.e. consumers first choose 
the expenditure on each group of goods, then choose consumption of each
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differentiated good according to prices of goods in that group of goods and 
expenditure on that group of commodities.
Throughout the study, only effects of changes in prices of goods imported 
from member countries and from non-member countries are considered. Hence 
it is assumed that entering customs union does not affect prices of domestically 
produced goods.
Now define good 1 as the good imported from i^referred countries, good 2 
as the good imported from non-preferred countries, and good 3 as the good 
produced domestically.
Tlien, using the cissumption of log-linear demand functions and two-stage 
budgeting, demand functions for good 1 , 2 and 3 can be written as
lo g Q i =  a i +  enlogpi -(- ei2logp2 +  tislogps -|- g JogV, 
logQ‘1 =  «2 +  t2ilogpi +  C22logp2 +  O2slogp-s -h p2logY.
logQ'i -  Ö3 +  ^3ilogpi +  C:nlogp2 -\- esslogps -|- r/s/oi/l
(5.1)
(5.2)
(5.3)
where
Qi: quantity demanded of good i {i= l, 2 , 3) 
üi : a constant {i= l, 2, 3)
P i  : tariff included price of good i (¿=1, 2, 3)
Cij : price elasticity of a change in ¡^rice of good j  to import demand of 
good i. 2, 3)
T)i : income elasticity of a change in total expenditure on group of 
commodities (automobiles) on demand of good i.
Ya Total expenditure on group of commodities.
Now, we will carry out the calculations on one of demand functions since 
calculations are the same for each equation. Focusing on equation 5.1, if we 
totally differentiate the equation 5.1,
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dQi _  ^
Qi
a p i  I d p 2  j _  ^  j _  ^
1^1—  + ei2—  +  ei3—  +t^P3
P i P 2 P 3
dy^
5"^
To calculate 4 ^ , consider the open form of expenditure and its total deriva­
tive,
Ta =  QiP\ +  Q 2 P2  +  Q3 P3
(IYa =  Q\dpi -\r Q2<ip2 +  Q3dp3 +  P\dQ\ P2dQ2 +  PadQa
Since dps =  0 (by the assumption that there is no change in price of good 3) 
and dQi =  0 (effects of only price changes are considered), change in expendi­
ture can be written as
dYA =  Qidpi +  Q2dp2
Then, percentage change in demand of good 1 becomes
dOi . dpi I dp2 I {Qldpi+Q2dp2 ) 
=  eii— +  ei2— + /^i y .
After some manipulations., 2
dQ
^  — (^ii +  + (ci2 +  (5.4)
Ql Pi P2
dp2
where k{ =  is the expenditure share of good i.
J A
Now recall that Cij is the price elasticity of the Marshallian demand curve. 
We can convert this to the price elasticity of the compensated demand curve, 
Pij by the relationship
where pij is the compensated price elasticity of a change in price of good j
^The last term can be opened as
'n ı^ ^
Multiplying the first term by ^  and the second term by it becomes
orYa P i  Ya P 2
Hence, the equation 5.4 follows from this.
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on demand of good i .  
Then,
In the same manner,
dQ\ dpi , dp2
(5.5)Qi
— Pii----
Pi
+ P1 2 ----
P2
dQ2 dp\ , dp2 (5.6)Q 2 — p21----Pi
+  P2 2 ----
P2
dQs dpi , dp2
(5.7)Qs — P'ii----Pi
+ P'i2----
P2
In these expressions, if we assume prices of imported goods are determined 
in competitive foreign markets, percentage changes in tariff inclusive prices of 
imported goods can be calculated as follows:
Let pC and P2 '' be the export prices of imports from member and non- 
member countries, respectively. Then, assuming ad-valorem tariffs, pre-union 
(tariff inclusive) prices of good 1 and good 2 are
P i= p T ( l  +  h )
P2 =  P2®(1 +  h ) ) respectively.
After the establishment of customs union, prices of good 1 and good 2 becomes 
pC and P2®(1 +  CET), respectively, where CET  is the common external tariff. 
Hence, percentage changes in prices of good 1 and good 2 due to joining customs 
union are :^
dp\ _
V i  P i ^ ( l + i i )
_
— 1+ii
0-^1
dp2 _ P2^ (^  + CET)-p2^ (^ +t2)
P 2  ~ ~  P 2 ^ ( l  +  ^ 2 )
_ dt2
~  1+^2
CET-t2
\+t2
^Since the after-union tariff is zero for good 1 and C E T  for good 2, dt\ represents the 
change in tariffs due to joining the customs union.
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where and ¿2 are tariff rates including all the import duties for member 
and non-member countries, respectively.
Since expressions for changes in trade flows are obtained in equations 5 .5 , 
5.6 and 5.7, we can define the trade creation and diversion using these expres­
sions. Ti'cvde creation occurs when there is an increase in imports from member 
countries that is not existent before the formation of customs union. The mea­
sure of it is taken as the value of that increase in imports calculated by using 
the after-union price of good 1 .'* Now recall that the change in imports from 
member countries was found to be in equation 5.5 as
d Q i —
dp2 '
P i P 2
inserting equivalents of ^  and
d Q i =
Then, trade creation becomes.
TC =
where ti represents the pre-union tariff rate on good 1 and represents the 
after-union price of good 1 , or export price of good 1 since tariffs on imports 
from member countries will be removed.
Trade diversion takes place when there is a switching of imports from 
non-member countries to imports from member countries (or from good 2 to 
good 1). If the good in consideration were a homogeneous one, then trade 
diversion would be the value of pre-union imports from non-member countries, 
if after union price of imports from member countries is less than the tariff 
included price of imports from non-member countries. However, the good in 
consideration is a differentiated one. Then, trade diversion becomes the value 
of change in imports from non-member countries which is calculated using the 
after-union prices of good 2. The after union price of good 2 is therefore
P2' ( l + i ; )  =  lgT (l +  i'2)
'See also [22]
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where is the after-union tariff rate on good 2 .
Recall that the change in imports from non-member countries was calcu­
lated in equation (5) as
dQ2 =  +  ¡J-22^)Q2
P 2
Then, trade diversion becomes
T D =  7 ^ (1  + t',)dQ,
-  +  t2 )(P 2 1 ^  +  d'22-^)Q2
The empirical estimation of trade creation and diversion will involve esti­
mates lor compensated price elasticities. In the following section, these ehis- 
ticities will be estimated by making regression for demand functions.
5.2 The Model for Estimating Elasticities
In order to estimate demand elasticities, in cin n good economy, one possible 
way is to estimate a demand function for good i of the form
Q i  =  { i , j  =  (5.8)
J=1
where
Q i  : quantity demanded of good i 
Ci : a constant {i =  1 , ...,n)
Pj : price of good j  {j =  l ,... ,n ) 
tij : price elasticities ( i j  =  l,... ,n ) 
r : time elasticity of demand
rn : total expenditure
Pi : income elasticity of demand for good i {i =  
t : time
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In estimating such a system of demand eqiuxtions, we may have the simul­
taneous equation bias since price is also determined by supply side in reality. 
This is a drawback of such an estimation. However, this problem can be re­
solved if deiricind equation can be identified from the data. Demand equation 
can be identified if (i) factors other than prices in demand function varies less 
than the corresponding factors of supply equation, or (ii) market is not in equi­
librium such that demand is less than supply at market price, or (iii) supply 
curve is infinitely elastic.
In this study, it is assumed that the market lor domestically produced goods 
is not in equilibrium due to insufficient demand; and in the market for imported 
goods, supply curves for imported goods are infinitely elastic. Therefore, there 
will be no simultaneous equation bias in estimations. As seen in figure 5.1, since 
the market for domestically produced goods is not in equilibrium (quantity 
derruinded, Q o, is less than the quantity supplied, Qs, at the market price 
Pm , quantity sold in market represents the quantity demanded. For imported 
goods, as in figure 5 .2 , cjuantity imported does not affect prices since supply 
curve is infinitely elastic, and quantity demanded (Q*) at equilibrium price 
(P*) represents the quantity sold in the market.
Figure 5.1: Insufficient demand for domestically produced goods
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Figure 5 .2 : Infinitely elastic supply curve for imported goods
Throughout the estimation, for demand equations of each good, a form such 
as in equation 5.8 will be used except the time variable. It is assumed that 
there is no change in tastes during the period ancdyzed. Taking the logarithm 
of equation 5.8, the demand function for good i is
logQi =  Ci +  rjilogm +  ^  eijlogpj =  l , . . . , n )  (5.9)
Among n commodities, some unrelated goods can be excluded from the 
analysis of good i due to negligible cross price elasticities. However, their total 
income effect is not negligible. Therefore, we should proceed by defining the 
Slutsky*^
Qj =  -  Vikj ( i j  =  1 , . . . ,  ?2) (5.10)
where
Pij : compensated price elasticity. 
kj : expenditure share of good j .
Note that the condition of being homogeneous of degree zero for compen- 
scited ehisticities can be written by using only price elasticiti es as:
^See Stone(1954) for details
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Then inserting equation 5.10 into equation 5.9 yields,
We can think
logQi =  Ci +  rji{logm -  ^  kjlogpj) +  ^  ßijiogpj
3 = 1  3 = 1
kjlogpj
3 = 1
term as the weighted mean of log prices, hence it can be perceived as the jDrice 
index, p. Then
iogQi =  Ci +  pilogi,—) +  V ] pijlogpj 
' P  3 = 1  ■
Now we can eliminate unrehvted goods because we have included the income 
effect of such price changes by using the Slutsky formula.
Now take a group of commodities, automobiles, which contains three goods. 
Then demand of automobile i is only affected by prices of automobiles and total 
expenditure on n goods in the economy. In fact we can extend this by saying we 
have only three types of automobiles that are the ones from group of countries 
1 , group of countries 2 and group of countries 3. By defining the first, the 
second and the third group of countries as member, non-member countries and 
home country, respectively, this analysis becomes compatible with the model 
of trade creation and diversion. Plence there are three demand equations to be 
estimated:
logQi =  Cl +  piilogpi +  Pulogp2 -|- Pxzlogp  ^ +  pilog{— )
, m .
logQ2 =  C2 +  P2i^ogpi -f p-22logp2 +  P2zlogp  ^ -|- r]2iog{—)
,rn.
logQ z  =  C3 -1- p zilogpi +  gs2logp2 +  pzzlogpz +  pzlog{— )
(.5.1 1 )
(.5.1 2)
(.5.1 .3)
where — is the index of real expenditures.
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We should have the condition that demand function is homogeneous of 
degree zero in prices, i.e. compensated price elasticities for each good should 
sum to zero:
n
i=l
After the estimation procedui'e, this condition should be checked for each good 
to exclude the money illusion from demand lunction.
Regression is carried out with quarterly data ol variables for periods be­
tween 1982 and 1994, and data is seasoncilly adjusted.
Since there are three equations to be estirricited and these are demand func­
tions of related goods, the regression is done simultaneously for three equa­
tions. The main advantage of such a system regression is that since errors of 
each equation is most probably correlated with each other, system regression 
cillows one to take into account this relationship and improve the efficiency 
of estimation. Hence the regression procedure employed in this model is the 
SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) method applied to the three demand 
equations simultaneously. The SUR method first carry out OLS estimation 
23i'ocedure applied to each equation separately, and from those first iteration 
coefficient estimates residuals are constructed. The coefficients are then revised 
in a second iteration to take into account the covariance between equation resid­
uals. Results of this regression is tested for significance using t-statistic. In 
order to determine the degree of collinearity in the regression, R?, is checked. 
It mccisures the percentage of variability in the data explained or accounted 
for by the regression model. Moreover, test of autocorrelation is done by using 
Durbin-Watson statistic and Box-Pierce Q-statistic.
The next section includes information on data used for empirical estima­
tions.
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5.3 Data
The estimcition of trade creation and diversion involves the use of quarterly 
data on tariffs, prices, quantities for automobile group and on real GNP. The 
sample period is chosen to be 1982-1994. Prices and quantities are collected 
lor three groups of countries: member countries, non-member countries and 
the home country, Turkey.
For the import data, quantities measured in number of automobiles and 
values of imports in USD for each country is obtained from State Institute of 
Statistics (SIS) [13]. For periods 1982-1985, products in category 87.02.11 is 
chosen for the product group used in this study. Categories lor periods 1985- 
1988 and 1988-1994 are chosen to be 87.02.22 and 87.0.8, respectively. The 
switching in categories is due to changes in numbering system of SIS. Import 
prices from different sources are calculated by dividing the value of imports by 
qucintity of imports from each group of country.
For domestically produced automobiles, values in TL and quantities are 
obtained from SIS [15] under the category 3843. Values are converted to USD 
using the exchange rate series (186..RF.ZF...) in International Financial Statis­
tics published by IMF [16]. Prices of domestically produces automobiles are 
calculated using the same method for imported goods.
Actual and planned tariff rates on automobiles imported from member and 
non-member countries are obtained from Automotive Manufacturers Associa­
tion (AMA) [2 ]. Tariff rates include public housing fund on imported goods.
The general production index is used as the i^roxirncite for real GNP, since 
quarterly GNP data for Turkey is not published between 1982-1987. The gen­
eral production index series are obtained from SSI [14].
Series for prices, quantities and production index are given in appendix A.
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5.4 Regression Results
In table 5.1, empirical results of the regression on system of demand equations 
5.11, 5.12 and 5.1.3 are summarized:
Equation
5.11
5.12
5.13
Coefficient
Cl
1^ 11
^12
fJ-13
Vi
Value
-1.59
-1.91
-0.82
2.38
3.09
t-statistic
-1.59
-6.95
-3.66
4.98
5.05
70%
Durbin-Watson
1.36
C2
/^21
/¿22
/ ¿ 2 3
72
C3
/ ¿ 3 1
/ ¿ 3 2
/ ¿ 3 3
73
-8.63
-1..34
-4.73
- 2.66
-2.15
3.59
5.57
-1.91
-0.09
-0.15
0.47
2.68
-5.24
4.12
4.98
-5.78
-0.98
-1.96
2.96
13.2
79%
95%
1.02
1.56
Table 5.1: Regression results
As seen in table 5.1, there is ciutocorrelation in equation 5.11 cind 5.12. 
DW-statistics for these equations are below the lower limit of DW (£>¿=1.40). 
For equation 5.13, regression yielded the DW-statistic which is in between the 
lower and upper limits of DW (Du=:1.72). Hence, the test is inconclusive for 
equation 5.13.
The autocorrelation problem is solved by taking the difference of each equa­
tion. The demand for good 1 can be rewritten using time subscripts as
712
^ogQi,i =  Cl +  giilogpi,t +  gulogp2,t +  /¿13 0^ 7 7 3 ,« +  giiog{— ),t (b.Dl)
If we carry this equation one period backward and multiply with pi (the cor­
relation coefficient for good 1 ),
pilogQi^t-i =  pyC\ -l· piPnicgpi^t-i P pigi2^ ogp2^ t-\ A pip-yzlogpz^ t-i +
pigilog(^)-,t-i (5.15)
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Now subtracting equation 5.15 from equation 5.14 yields the following dif­
ference equation:
o^gQy,t =  pylogQi^t-i +  C i(l — pCj -|- pnlogpi t^ — Pipiilogpi^t-i +  Pi2iogp2,t ~
7H/
PiPv2 logp2 ,t-i +  P\zlogp'i,t ~  piPi3iogp3,t-i +  P\log{— ),t -
P
I T l
PiVilog{— ),t-i (5.16)
Similarly, difference equations for good 2 and .3 are:
^ogQ'2,t =  P2^ogQ2,t-i +  <^ 2(1 — P2) +  P2ilogpi^t — P2P2\logpi^t-\ +  P22^ogp2^t —
I I T
p2 P2 2 logP2 ,t-i +  P23logp3,t -  p2P'23logp3,t-i +  V2 log{ — ),t -
P
T T l
p2V2log(— ),i-i (5.17)
logQ:i,t =  p-ilogQ's^t-i +  Cail -  />3) +  p-sPogpi^t -  p3P 3 ilo g p \,t -i +  Pz2logp2,t ~
.771.
PsP32Íogp2,t-i + P33Íogp3,t -  P3P33logp3,t-\ + p3log{— ),t
P
p3il3log{— ),t-i
P
(5.18)
This system of demand equations is estimated by using the iterative SUR 
method which corresponds to the Asymptotically Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML) estimation in the literature. In this method, SUR method 
is cipplied to the non-linear system of equations as previously but number 
of iterations is more than two in order to achieve convergence for estimates. 
Table 5.2 represents the estimation results for equations 5.16, 5.17 and 5.17.
Note that the Box-Pierce Q-statistic is included in results instead of DW- 
stcitistic to test for autocorrelation since DW-statistic cannot be used for equa­
tions with autoregressive terms. The critical values for Q-test are found using 
the x'^  values under the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation with 12 lags 
and 9 5 % confidence as 4.4 and 23.3. Since Q-statistics for each equation lies 
in between critical values, the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation is accepted.
Note also that the aim of the regression is just to find recisonable estimates 
for elasticities to be used in the estimation of trade creation and diversion.
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Equation Coefficient Value t-statistic Q-statistic(for 12 lags)
5.16 Pi
Cl
Pii
Pl2
Pn
Vi
0.46 4.04
-2.73 - 1.88
-1.45 -4.69
-0.33 -1.43
1.99 3.33
2.59 .3.21
74% 20.88
5.17 P2
C2
P2 1
P2 2
/i'23
72
0.8
-15.93
0.26
-0.84
3.26
4.22
10.94
-3.84
0.58
-2 29
2.92
2.35
88% 7.53
5.18 P-i
C3
/231
PZ2
p33
73
0.53
-2.53
0.07
- 0.02
0.80
1.8
4.08
-4.59
0.74
- 0.2 96% 5.65
3.25
4.79
Table 5 .2 : Regression results for autoregressive model
Therefore, variables with low t-statisti,cs will not be excluded from the set 
of explanatory variables in order to obtain at least approximate values for 
elasticities.
Therefore, we can proceed to test for significance and collinearity in each 
equation. It will be appropriate to start with equation 5.16.
For imports from member countries, good 1, it is seen in table 5.2 that all 
of the variables are found to be significant, except for logp2 , with a t-statistic of 
-1.43. This low t-statistic may be interpreted ¿is good 2 is a weak complement 
for good 1. The autocorrelation coefficient, pi is found to be significant with 
an estimate of 0.46. It means that the quantity demanded of the last period 
affects the quantity demanded this period in such a way that about the half of 
the demand for previous period enters into the demand function of this period. 
The coefficient of determination, R^, for equation 5.16 has been calculated cis 
7 4 % which is an acceptable result.
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As seen in table 5 .2 , price elasticities are consistent with downward slop­
ing demand curve convention. The own price elasticity is negative and cross 
lárice elasticity for an increase in price of imports from non-member countries is 
negative which means that imported goods from different sources are comple­
ments. In fact, imported goods being complements is contrary to the general 
belief. The cross price elasticity for an increase in price of domestically pro­
duced goods came out to be positive which means that imports from member 
countries cind domestically produced goods cire imperfect substitutes.
Considering the regression procedure for demand of imports from non­
member countries (good 2 ), which corresponds to the equation 5.17 in the 
model, all of the variables have found to be significant except lor logpi, with a 
t-statistic of 0.58. This term corresponds to the cross price elasticity between 
good 1 and good 2 , but now the results show that good 1 is a weak substitute 
for good 2. This is a contradiction with the complementarity result found in 
equation 5.16. Hence, a Wald test has been carried out to test for the equality 
of signs of ¡ii2 and P2 1 · Results of the Wald test has shown that compensated 
cross price elasticities for good 1 and good 2 are symmetric and has a negative 
value. Therefore, we can say from the result of the Wald test that good 1 and 
good 2 are complements of each other. The autocorrelation coefficient, p2 is 
estimated to be 0.8. Moreover, the coefficient of determination is high, with a 
value of 8 8 %.
In equcition 5.18, as seen in table 5.2, the correlation coefficient, p^  is found 
to be significant with an estimate of 0.5.3. Among other variables, ordy logpi 
cincl logp2 have low t-statistics (0.74 and -0.20, respectively). Hence the coef­
ficient of logp2 in the equation for good 3 is came out to be negative, which 
means that good 2 and good 3 are complements. But in regression results 
for equation 5.17, we can see that the coefficient of logpz is positive. Hence, 
we have cvgain a contradictory result for signs of cross price elasticities. The 
equality of signes of p 2 3  ¡¡‘■nd /Í32 is tested using the Wald test and results of the 
test showed that signs of these coefficients are equal and have a positive value. 
Therelbre, we can say that good 2 and good 3 are substitutes. The measure ol 
collinearity, R^, has been found to be 96% which is a very high value.
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There is a puzzling point in regression results for equation 5.18. The com- 
l^ensated own price elasticity came out to be positive which means that good .3 
is estimated to be a giffen good. This is contrary to the downward sloping 
demand curve assumption of the microeconomic theory.
Note that the own price elasticity is positive but small in magnitude (0.8). 
Hence, we are not in so much trouble. This small positiveness may be due to 
behavioral misspecifications or violations of ceteris paribus assumptions.
The main behavioral assumption is that consumers are rational and mcix- 
irnize their utilities which depend only on consumption amounts of different 
goods. However, utility function may also depend on qualitative variables 
which are hard to include in the analysis. For instance, the utility of cin indi- 
vichud may increase if he/she consumes more of a commodity, whose price is 
increcising, due to some kind of competition among consumers. In particular, 
the recison may be the Veblen effect^, in which the quantity demanded is a 
function of both real and conspicuous prices.
The second possibility is that some ceteris paribus assumptions may be 
violated. Note that price elasticities are calculated by partially differentiating 
the demand function with respect to a particular price and other prices and 
variables are assumed to be constant (ceteris paribus). However, it may be the 
case that some variables change so as to increase the demand of that good.
According to regression results, therefore, it can be said that good 1 and 
good 2 are complements of each other,and good 3 is an imperfect substitute 
for both good 1 and good 2.
In section 5.2, it was mentioned that the sum of compensated price elas­
ticities for a particular good should be equal to zero if money illusion is ruled 
out. However, regression results reveal that this is not the case. In fact,
<^11 T +  /^ 13 =  0 .2 1
/^21 +  +  A*23 = 2 .6 8
^See [21] pg.27-27
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/^ 31 +  fJ'32 +  /¿33 — 0.85
This result implies that there is money illusion in the demand for all goods. 
We can say that the demand of imports from non-member countries is the 
least well-behaved demand function in the sense that sum of compensated 
price elasticities is the largest one among other demand functions.
In ciddition to the analysis of results equation by equation, there is the 
result on the correlation among residuals of equations: It can be seen in ta-
Eqn. 5.16 Eqn. 5.17 Eqn. 5.18
Eqn. 5.16 1 0.54 0.34
Eqn. 5.17 1 0.24
Eqn. 5.18 1
Table 5.3: Correlation among equations
ble 5.3 thcit errors of the equation 5.16 and equation 5.17 are fairly positively 
correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.54. Hence, some of the causes of 
regression errors (possibly omitted explanatory variables, random shocks, etc.) 
in equation 5.16 and equation 5.17 are most probably the same for these two 
demand functions. In fact, this is not a surprise and an intuitive result since 
both of these equations are import demand functions. Other relations among 
equations are weaker than this, with 0.24 for eqiuitions 5.17 and 5.18, and 
0.34 for equations 5.16 and 5.18.
For all of the goods, income elasticities turned out to be positive and greater 
than unity, implying that automobiles are luxury goods for the Turkish con­
sumer.
In sum, we have obtained estimates of compensated price elasticities and 
income elasticities to be used in the estimation of trade creation and diversion. 
The following section includes empirical results and interpretations for trade 
creation ¿ind diversion.
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5.5 Results and Comments
In section 5.1, formulas for estimates of trade creation (TC) and diversion (TD) 
were derived as
TC =
™  =  jg j( l  +  iy (№ lfi7  +dt^l+ti
dt'2
where Q[ and Q 2 refers to pre-union quantities for good 1 and good 2; and 
Pi and P2 refers to pre-union prices for good I and good 2.
(Compensated elasticities, ^¿/s, were estimated in section 5.4 and they are 
assumed to be constant for the time period analyzed in this study. Hence, in 
order to calculate trade creation and diversion, we need pre-union values of 
prices, tariffs and quantities.
As discussed in section 2.1 that estimation of trade creation and diversion 
will be done for five scenarios about the entrance date and alignment to GET.
Now each scenario will be analyzed starting from the first one.
Scenario 1
In the first scenario, entrance date was assumed to be the beginning of 1995 
and external tariffs on imports from non-member countries are not ciligned to 
GET (=10%). For this scenario, pre-union cind after-union tariff rates on mem­
ber and non-member countries are ti =  0.-36, =  0; and ¿ 2  =  0.445, ¿2 ~
0.272^, respectively. Prices of imported goods just before the entrance date, 
fburth quarter of 1994, are pi =  $20933 and p2 =  $7923, respectively.
The pre-union quantities of imports, Qi and Q 2 , correspond to imported 
quantities in the last quarter of 1994. Since we estimate trade creation and 
diversion for the first quarter of 1995, these values are adjusted for the first 
qucu-ter using seasonality factors and yielded Qi =  1230 and Q 2 =  2138.
^Actual tariff rate on 01/01/199.5
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Therefore, trade creation and diversion in the first quarter following the 
entrance to customs union for the first scenario are
TC  =  $8.01 million
7'D =  $0.47million
Note that trade diversion is calculated to be positive which means that 
there is no welfare worsening diversion of imports. A positive trade diversion 
is observed here since good 1 and good 2 are found to be complements. If auto­
mobiles were homogeneous goods, then trade diversion would become negative 
in each case since goods would be perfect substitutes of each other and all price 
changes are negative. Indeed, the positive trade diversion improves the welfare 
by $0.47 m. Therefore, net welfare change, A W , is equivalent to
AIT =  TC  +  TD  =  $8.48 million
Scenario 2
In the second scenario, it was assumed that the entrcxnce date is the begin­
ning of 1995 and external tariffs are aligned to GET.Hence, ti =  0.36, =
0;and ^2 =  0.445, =  GET =  0.10.
Pre-union prices and quantities are the same as in the first scenario. There­
fore, trade creation and diversion are
TC  =  $8.76 million
TD =  $1.70 million
Again trade diversion becomes positive which implies trade expansion in­
stead of diversion. The net welfare change, is equivalent to
AIT =  $10.46 million
Note that aligning the GET improves welfare compared to not aligning.
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Scenario 3
In the third scenario, it was assumed that the entrance date is the beginning 
of 1996 and external tariffs are not aligned to GET and remains constant at 
its 1995 value. Hence, ¿j =  0.275, t[ =  0; and ¿2 =  0.272, ¿2 =  0.272.
Pre-union prices corresponding to the fourth quarter of 1995 (pre-union 
prices) are estimated by regressing prices on time and then these estimates are 
seasonally adjusted for the first quiirter. Hence, pre-union prices are pi =  $9550 
cind P2 =  $2188.
Pre-union quantities are forecasted using the regression on demand equci- 
tions 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18. After being seasonally adjusted, pre-union quantities 
become Qi =  14454 and Q 2 =  30200.
Then, trade creation and diversion for the first quarter of 1996 become 
TC =  $33.86 million 
TT> =  $ -  3.71 million
Note that trade diversion for this scenario came out to be negative. It 
means that there is a welfare worsening switch from good 2.
Hence, net welfare change can be measured as 
A W  =  $30.15 million
Scenario 4
In the fourth scenario, the entrance date is again the beginning of 1996, 
but external tariffs are aligned to GET. Therefore, pre-union and after-union 
tariffs are ¿1 =  0.275, t\ -  0; and ¿2 =  0.272, t'^  =  0.10. Initial prices and
quantities are the same as in the third scenario.
Therefore, trade creation and diversion are 
TC =  $38.69 million
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TD =  $3.32 million
Trade diversion is yielded to be ¡positive (contrary to the case for the third 
scenario) which improves the welfare. Hence, net change in welfare for the first 
quarter of 1996 is
AIT =  $42.01 million
Scenario 5
In the fifth scenario, it was assumed that tariffs on member countries were 
removed cit the beginning of 1996 and tariffs on non-member countries are 
aligned to CET at the beginning of 2000. Hence, ti =  0, t\ =  0; and 
¿2 =  0.272, t'^  =  0.10
Pre-union prices and quantities are estimated by the same method employed 
for the third scenario. Estimated prices and quantities for the fourth quarter 
of 1999 are
Pi =  $1778, p2 =  $2291 
Qi =  446684, Q 2 =  112202
Therefore, trade creation and diversion for the first quarter of 2000 are 
TC =  $35.44 million
TD =  $25.25 million
Then, net welfare change for the first quarter of 2000 is equivalent to 
AIT =  $60.69 million
Therefore, we have estimated trade creation and diversion for each scenario. 
Compcirison of these scenarios will be based on quantities demanded and wel- 
fcire changes which are adjusted to prices of 1995 with an average inflation rate 
of 3% for USD. Table 5.4 summarizes the results of this section:
CHAPTER 5 54
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
36 36 27.5 27.5 0
44.5 44.5 27.2 27.2 27.2
27.2 10 27.2 10 10
Pi( 20933 20933 9550 9550 1778
P2($) 7923 7923 2188 2188 2188
Qi 1230 12.30 14454 14454 446684
Q2 21.38 2138 30200 30200 112202
(IQ I 520 569 4520 5165 19993
dQ, 86 310 -21.57 19.30 14019
( I Q 3 -790 -673 -1285 -10.55 373
TC($ m.) 8.01 8.76 33.86 .38.69 35.44
TD(.$ in.) 0.47 1.70 -3.71 3.32 25.25
A W ($  rn.) 8.48 10.46 29.27 40.79 52.35
Table 5.4: Comparison of trade and welfare changes among scenarios
It can be seen in table 5.4 that change in demands of imported goods 
cire positive for all scenarios except the third one. Recall that tariffs on non- 
member countries are not reduced in this scenario so as to align to CET. 
Moreover, demand of domestically produced goods decreases in all scenarios 
except the fifth one. This result is intuitive since it is assumed that there is no 
change in prices of good 3 in all scenarios. The positive change in derricind of 
good 3 in scenario five seems to be due to a smooth entrance to customs union 
with four year delay for alignment to CET.
As seen in table 5.4, net welfare change is the largest for the fifth scenario. 
Therefore, within the framework of this study, it can be concluded that the 
fifth scenario which involves tariff removals for imports from member countries 
in 1996, and alignment to CET for imports from non-member countries in 
2000 is the iTiost appropriate one among other scenarios if welfare effects are 
considered.
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5.6 Concluding Remarks
This study has shown that customs union of Turkey and EC in automobiles 
will yield a substantial gain in welfare for Turkey in all of scenarios about 
the entrance date and alignment of external tariffs to GET. The largest gciin 
in welfare is in the fifth scenario in which tariffs on members are removed in 
the beginning of 1996 and tariffs on non-rnernbers are aligned to GET in the 
beginning of 2000. In fact, this is the most expected scenario to be implemented 
by Turkey and EC on automobiles.
Moreover, estimated changes in quantities demanded has shown that the 
change in quantity demanded for domestically produced automobiles is positive 
only in the fifth scenario. This can be interpreted as a policy implication thcit, 
there is no need to subsidize the TAI only in scenario five. In other scenarios, 
the TAI should be subsidized in such a manner that the fall in demand for 
domestically produced automobiles in the short-term will not increase averiige 
cost of production further.
However, one should note that this study examines only static effects of 
customs union on TAI and does not take into account changes in prices of 
domestically produces goods due to dynamic effects such as increased com­
petition, stimulus to technical change, etc. If price of domesticcilly produced 
goods also decreases, then net welfare changes in all scenarios will fall due to 
decreased trade creation effects.
Within the framework of this study, results indicate that the estciblishment 
of customs union in automobiles will lead to welfare improvements for Turkey, 
contrary to the general belief that customs union will worsen the welfare posi­
tion of Turkey.
Appendix A
Data Used in Estimations
Quarter Q \ Q 2 <?3 Pi P2 P3 ^  (Production Index)
1982-1 660 148 5158 5359 9571 6303 65.10
2 433 111 10792 5493 9554 6147 67.10
3 729 47 7797 4902 7094 5936 69.00
4 610 56 6904 5016 5216 5695 80.20
1983-1 736 155 8984 5340 9601 5787 71.90
2 502 154 11717 5864 10456 5766 73.40
3 872 32 9669 4478 5579 5463 73.90
4 715 51 12237 4380 5920 4947 85.50
1984-1 1170 52 13693 4248 4294 4487 80.80
2 1151 211 15647 5847 3551 4309 79.90
3 1950 1523 11108 4082 3030 4206 81.60
4 1530 1260 14330 4395 3248 4033 95.90
1985-1 1667 1099 13817 4642 2733 4214 80.50
2 1877 1272 16083 5386 2651 3649 84.10
3 1624 2343 13571 6006 2243 4573 90.40
4 1004 1794 16806 7692 2922 4622 103.00
1986-1 837 1948 18361 7866 4019 5028 90.50
2 379 790 21774 10385 4191 4927 94.50
3 812 826 17547 9800 4278 5238 102.50
4 562 811 24335 12077 3718 5400 112.50
1987-1 375 208 25211 11675 6403 5516 99.00
2 276 348 27707 12377 4528 5709 104.80
3 915 746 23095 10834 8089 6159 109.30
4 986 1239 32220 14771 5106 6336 129.00
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1988-1 732 1495 33146 12809 3066 7034 112.70
2 600 374 33712 14416 5311 7226 107.70
3 530 188 23891 11852 7817 6606 110.50
4 453 220 28996 13361 5313 6470 118.50
1989-1 346 108 25486 11494 10125 7062 108.60
2 559 426 30209 14813 5175 6864 109.50
3 765 644 23885 14324 4367 7461 119.50
4 2762 1239 38781 17988 5583 7631 127.90
1990-1 3495 2974 41889 17693 4795 8572 120.70
2 6629 11602 43397 14246 4280 9060 120.10
3 6169 18552 32499 12079 5478 9020 130.20
4 8058 14736 47952 9584 6470 9882 139.70
1991-1 1211 8621 33524 16358 5868 9513 117.80
2 2241 6103 50494 11981 6332 8708 122.10
3 1068 5892 46733 14738 6717 8349 138.70
4 1815 6738 64582 17530 5310 8909 144.40
1992-1 1503 6161 66082 14923 5587 8952 129.70
2 2046 8501 66018 13693 5358 8672 128.00
3 1515 10687 54427 14025 5371 9375 143.60
4 2703 17381 78702 19464 5480 9436 147.70
1993-1 2215 15334 79188 14057 5254 10024 1.34.00
2 4683 21338 86245 13088 5508 10068 143.90
3 5044 20092 71583 11093 5504 9955 156.30
4 10198 23732 106427 12316 6416 9740 161.10
1994-1 4326 9057 74196 10642 5248 8076 142.10
2 2832 678 37285 6923 10168 5875 131.40
3 931 2768 42440 17362 9265 7750 142.60
4 1709 2939 53345 20933 7923 7893 153.20
Table A .l: Quarterly data on quantities, prices and production index
Bibliography
[1] Aksoy. Turk Olornotiv Sanayii Yatırımları. Avcıol Matbaası, İstanbul, 
1990.
[2] Otomotiv Sanayii Derneği (AMA). Komple araç ithalatında tarifeler.
[3] Otomotiv Sanayii Derneği (AMA). Turk Otomotiv Sanayii Genel ve 
İstatistik Bilgiler Bülteni. Otomotiv Sanayii Derneği Yaymları:28, 1995.
[4] Balassa. Trade creation and diversion in the European common market. 
The Economic Journal., 77, 1967.
[5] Baldwin and Murray. MEN tariff reductions and developing country trade 
benefits under the GSP. The Economic Journal, 87, 1977.
[6] Bhagwati cind Srinivasan. Lectures on International Trade. MIT Press, 
1983.
[7] Bhuyan. Economic Integration in South Asia: An Exploratory Study. 
Dacca University, 1979.
[8] Bozkurt. Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu. Alternatif Üniversite. Ağaç 
Yayıncılık, 1992.
[9] Chacholiades. Principles of International Economics. McGraw Hill, 1981.
[10] Clague. Tariff preferences and separable utility. The American Economic 
Review, papers and proceedings, 61, 1971.
[11] Cline, Kawanabe, Kronsjo, and Williams. Trade Negotiations in the Tokyo 
round: A quantitative assesment. Wcishington D.C., 1978.
58
CHAPTER 5 59
[12] Dayal and Dayal. Trade creation and trade diversion: New concepts, new 
methods of measurement. Weltwirtschaftliches-Archiv, 113(1):125-169, 
1977.
[13] Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü. Dış ticaret istatistikleri (1982-1994).
[14] Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü. Donemler itibariyle Uretim-istihdam-Eğilim 
(1982-1994).
[15] Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü. Sanayi ui’etim istatistiklei'i (1982-1994).
[16] International Monetary Fund. International financial statistics, 1995.
[17] Ginman, Pugel, and Walter. Tokyo round tariff concessions and exports 
from developing countries. Trade and Development, (2), 1980.
[18] Gokdere and Tore. Gumruk birliği ve Turk Otomotiv Sanayii. ATAUM, 
Özel Raporlar Dizisi, No. 1, 1994.
[19] Holland. Uncommon Market. The MacMillan Press, 1980.
[20] Kreinin. Trade creation and trade diversion by the EEC and EFTA. 
Economia Internazionale, 22, 1969.
[21] Leibenstein. Bandwagon, Snob and Veblen effects in the theory of con­
sumers’ demand. In Mansfield, editor. Microeconomics: Selected readings, 
pages 25-27. Norton&Company, Inc., 1985.
[22] MacPhee. The consistency of partial equilibrium estimates of trade cre­
ation and diversion. Weltwirtschaftliches-Archiv, 123:81-92, 1987.
[23] Meade. lEe Theory of Customs Unions. 1955.
[24] Overturf. The Economic Principles of European Integration. Praeger, 
Newyork, 1986.
[25] Rahman, Bhuyan, and Reza. The trade effects of a South Asian customs 
union: An expository study. The Pakistan Development Review, 20(1), 
1981.
CHAPTER 5 60
[26] Sawyer and Sprinkle. Alternative empirical estimates of trade creation and 
trade diversion: A comparison of Baldwin-Murray and Verdoorn models. 
Weltwirtschaftliches-Archiv, 125(l):61-73, 1989.
[27] EFTA Secretariat. The effects of the EFTA on the economics of member 
states, 1969.
[28] Sellekaerts. How meaningful are empirical studies on trade ceation and 
diversion. Weltwirtschaftliches-Archiv, 109(4):519-553, 1973.
[29] Tezer. 'I’urkiye’deki Otomotiv Sanayii. Presentation Paper in “Gumruk 
Birliği ve Turk Otomotiv Sanayii” Seminar in ATAUM, 1994.
30] Viner. The customs union issue. Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Studies in the Administration of International Law and Organiza­
tion, (10), 1950.
